Si vis bellum, para pacem? How Khartoum’s precarious relationship with South Sudan could bring peace to Darfur
By 2010, the conflict in Darfur had cost an estimated 400,000 lives and displaced more than 2.7 million. After years of fighting, a 60-day ceasefire was signed on February 20 between the government and representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). This has long been a sign of hope for peace in a region battered by war and destruction. However, JEM units were spared in recent fighting, but other rebel groups were still targeted. And to what extent are the peace efforts, which in themselves are to be welcomed, taking place in a climate of a new north-south civil war that is still not excluded? The Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, tries to pacify the front in Darfur in order to have his back free for a renewed confrontation with South Sudan, which is willing to secession?
On February 20, the deal was signed by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim in N’Djamena, the capital of neighboring Chad. This agreement is noteworthy since, until May 2009, the JEM was one of the few groups unwilling to discuss the conflict with the Sudanese government. In addition, it is the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) that also refuses to speak to the government until there is no end to the violence. The location of the negotiations is also important considering that Chad has so far supported JEM and other rebel groups and has become a haven for many displaced Darfurers. Without the support of Chad, which to this day has provided the rebels with a retreat, the insurgents would not have been able to stand up to the government of Sudan.
Despite the recent welcome truce, there is a risk that Bashir’s maneuver could be used to temporarily keep the JEM at bay. In parallel to the peace negotiations with ten other rebel groups in Doha, air strikes on settlements in Darfur are taking place. Rebels in the area report that within two days, 50 civilians have been victims of fighting in the strategically important region in central Darfur. The only aid organization on site is forced to cease its activities. According to the Médecins du Monde organization, 100,000 people were displaced by the fighting. The latest attacks can be interpreted as an attempt by the government to use force to force the remaining rebel groups to give in. Indeed, African Union and United Nations mediators, Qatar hosts, and U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration are urging rebel groups to negotiate with the Sudanese government in parallel with JEM and ultimately link the two agreements together.
Khartoum’s sudden zeal to force the rebel groups to a ceasefire, if not peace, can be explained by the possible independence of South Sudan and the independence referendum in January 2011. If the oil-rich south decided to secede after the referendum, it would likely mean war again. From the perspective of Khartoum, peace in Darfur would be particularly important in order not to have to wage a two-front war against the south and west of the country. It is therefore not unlikely that the fear of a secession from the south will undermine the government’s actions in Khartoum. President Bashir could also have in mind to use the upcoming national elections to legitimize himself and his party’s rule despite the International Criminal Court’s warrant for arrest. “Successful” elections could be used as an argument not to hold Bashir responsible for his war crimes and serious crimes against humanity.
The international community, the EU and Germany are now being asked to support the ceasefire between Khartoum and JEM, to persuade other rebel groups to participate and ultimately to initiate a comprehensive peace process in Darfur. At the same time, however, efforts should be made to prevent the notorious regime in Khartoum from performing any military action against South Sudan in the event of a secession. There is still the possibility of an international concerted initiative in this direction, in which the People’s Republic of China in particular should be held responsible due to its close economic contacts with Khartoum. A war between north and south is still avertable, which would undoubtedly destabilize the entire region.
The responsibility to protect and the humanitarian situation in Darfur
The responsibility to protect was unanimously decided in 2005 by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. How should it be interpreted in relation to the current humanitarian situation in Darfur??
The responsibility to protect is primarily intended to ensure that crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing are recognized and prevented in good time by UN member states, the UN itself, regional and subregional organizations and civil society actors. The responsibility to protect is based on three pillars, which stipulate that the respective state has primary responsibility. If a government fails to protect its own population, responsibility for protection is transferred to the international community (2nd pillar) and to the UN (3rd pillar), whereby coercive measures such as sanctions or even military intervention are not excluded.
After the International Criminal Court issued a warrant on 4 March 2009 for Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, the Sudanese government has expelled several of the country’s humanitarian organizations. The organizations remaining in Sudan are overwhelmed by the situation and a humanitarian catastrophe is looming. There is a lack of water, food, sanitary facilities and adequate medical care. Shortly after the organizations were expelled, the UN spoke of about 1.1 million Darfuris who have to get by without food and health care and another million without access to water.
The UN has examined the current situation in Darfur together with the Sudanese government (Government of Sudan & United Nationes: Joint Assessment Mission to Darfur), paying particular attention to the provision of food, water, medical care, accommodation and sanitary facilities. At a press conference at the end of March 2009 to announce the investigation, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, called for the expulsion of numerous international aid organizations to be lifted quickly, although the Sudanese government, the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are trying to They will not be able to permanently control the situation by bridging gaping gaps in supply.
In order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, the maintenance of water pumps and sanitary facilities is particularly important, but cannot be guaranteed in the current situation. The upcoming rainy season will make the situation even worse: entire regions can be cut off from the outside world by the continuing heavy rain, emergency shelters can be flooded, diseases spread more easily. Another problem is the access of government employees to refugee camps, since their residents are often anti-government.
Unfortunately, the international response to the impending emergency is hesitant, and the Sudanese government has so far not been cooperative. John Holmes emphasizes that responsibility for protection is primarily a preventive measure: if a country concerned does not want to receive humanitarian aid, it cannot be forced to do so. The Sudanese government committed itself in the “Joint Assessment to Darfur” mentioned above to fully facilitate the work of the aid organizations still on the ground. But that alone will not be enough to prevent the humanitarian situation in Darfur from deteriorating. National NGOs have been asked by the Sudanese government to take over the functions of the designated organizations, but they are unable to carry out all activities immediately. The UN report states that at least most of the bottlenecks (water and sanitation supplies) can be resolved by international and Sudanese NGOs, the Sudanese government, and local UN agencies if the necessary funding is provided.
Is the UN doing justice to the responsibility to protect? Loud the third The pillar of the "Responsibility to Protect" calls on the international community and the UN to intervene promptly and directly, among other things to prevent or end crimes against humanity. Failure to provide or prevent humanitarian aid, which could develop into a human disaster for an entire region, could, however, be seen as a crime against humanity. If there is a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, it is questionable whether the Sudanese government will be blamed for the lack of aid: after the tropical cyclone "Nargis" hit Myanmar in spring 2008, the obstacles to international aid measures by the Myanmar government were removed Although heavily criticized worldwide, this did not have any consequences on the part of the UN.
In order to realize responsibility for protection in Darfur, the UN must reach a consensus, which also includes the African Union and the Arab League. However, as long as the UN cannot agree on a common course of action with everyone involved, the violations of the responsibility to protect – as in the case of Myanmar – will have no consequences for the Sudanese government.
The state of the Darfur peace process – superficial progress, immense hurdles, and lack of will
The peace talks between the Sudanese government and a rebel group from Darfur in Doha, Qatar have led to the signing of a letter of intent for a peace process. However, the political and operational hurdles are so great that the parties’ expressions of peace must be described as lip service. If the peace process is to get going, the international community, and especially the European Union, must provide critical support and targeted pressure.
On February 17, after a week of negotiations in the Qatar capital of Doha, representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese government signed a letter of intent. The document expresses the will of the parties to resolve the Darfur conflict peacefully with ‘united forces’ and to choose a comprehensive approach that would also take the underlying causes of the conflict into account.
In order to build mutual trust and create a positive climate for the planned peace negotiations, both sides made concessions and decided to protect the civilian population in Darfur, to facilitate access to humanitarian aid and to exchange prisoners.
On March 4, three judges from the International Criminal Court (ICC) granted an arrest motion against Sudanese President Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. As a result, the Sudanese government expelled 13 humanitarian agencies from the country, thereby violating the core confidence building elements of the letter of intent. Nevertheless, both parties have agreed to continue the peace talks. However, the JEM had threatened to rethink its position if the Sudanese government did not cooperate with the ICC and extradited Al-Bashir to The Hague.
Since the beginning of the Darfur conflict in 2003, there have been a series of ceasefire agreements, declarations to end hostilities and commitments to peaceful conflict resolution. No initiative has been crowned with success so far.
The reasons for the failed peace efforts have been the same for years and must be sought at both a political and an operational level.
At the political level, there are various factors why the renewed peace talks have to be called half-hearted and have little chance of success. The peace talks between the JEM rebels and the Sudanese government were anything but comprehensive, as two other important rebel groups did not take part and the other civil society in the Muslim community was not represented. The two discussion parties also failed to set clear negotiation goals. It would have been appropriate to agree to end the armed conflict and lay the foundation for a stable ceasefire agreement. In this sense, the joint declaration of intent must be described as a result that is to be welcomed but overall lean.
In theory it is clear which elements have to be considered for a successful peace process. The most Analysts emphasize the importance of comprehensive peace talks in which all relevant conflict parties participate without preconditions. Darfur experts also emphasize three factors that are central to the stability and credibility of a peace agreement: (1) Stop armed confrontations and create minimal security through mutual security guarantees and their monitoring by peacekeepers; (2) resolving land rights disputes and establishing a fair land rights system; (3) State reparations to compensate victims.
Sudan expert David Reeves is of the opinion that the current peace talks have only progressed to the extent that the members of the Arab League and the JEM currently have overlapping interests. JEM benefits from these bilateral talks by establishing itself as the only interlocutor among the Darfur rebel groups and making its political agenda heard. Various Arab League member states pursue their own interests and support the regime in Khartoum without addressing the needs of the non-Arab population of Darfur. While Qatar wants to be a mediator, Egypt is particularly interested in the stability and territorial integrity of Sudan. Libya and Saudi Arabia have also played a less constructive role so far. The Sudanese government itself sees the peace talks as a means of demonstrating its goodwill to the international community. With the talks, however, the regime poses little risk, since only one rebel group takes part and the numerous other rebel groups in Darfur are so divided that a peace process with power-sharing mechanisms is a long way off.
In view of the arrest warrant against Sudanese President Bashir, the willingness to talk primarily serves to convince the Security Council of a postponement under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. A decision between peace and justice is to be forced on the Security Council. The Khartoum regime wants the international community to believe that prosecuting Bashir could undermine peace talks and lead to additional violent unrest in Darfur. On the contrary, a postponement would allow the catastrophic humanitarian situation to be improved and the ongoing peace talks to continue successfully.
However, the experience of the past 20 years can be used to counter this argument. During this time, the ruling party – the National Islamic Front (NIF), now the NCP – did not keep a single agreement with other domestic parties to the conflict. An example of the recent past was the government’s unilaterally declared ceasefire on November 12, 2008, which was broken within 24 hours by air strikes on civilian targets. It is therefore doubtful that the government is serious this time. For its part, the Justice and Equality Movement owes its sole participation in the talks to both its military strength and the negative attitude of another rebel group – Sudan Liberation Army, SLA. This exclusive negotiating position is entirely in the spirit of JEM, which is trying to establish itself as the only legitimate opposition group in Darfur.
The political reasons mentioned are major hurdles on the way to a comprehensive and sincere peace process. You are making the first step of an armistice agreement a difficult task. This necessary first step is made even more difficult by operational and technical obstacles.
The peace talks in Doha raise hopes of an early ceasefire worldwide. In a recent article, however, Sudan expert Alex de Waal gives various operational and technical reasons why a ceasefire agreement is not within easy reach and is difficult to implement.
First, an effective ceasefire agreement requires the participation of all relevant conflict parties. So far, as described above, various groups have not been considered, while others prefer to continue fighting.
Second, most negotiators mistakenly believe that a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities can be negotiated quickly and easily. However, this is not possible for operational reasons. A ceasefire agreement is a complex military undertaking that requires extensive preparation and training. The military decision-makers of all parties to the conflict must be trained in the rules and procedures of a ceasefire and must be made aware of the various development options for such a ceasefire. This training must take place before the ceasefire negotiations and, according to expert estimates, takes at least six months. In addition, there are at least three months for the actual negotiations. Negotiating a ceasefire and implementing it successfully is therefore a lengthy undertaking that must be well prepared.
Third, it is vital to supply combatants during an armistice. In a complex conflict situation such as that in Darfur, the rebel groups in particular take care of themselves through conflict-related activities such as trade taxes, theft and other criminal activities, as well as attacks on enemy troops and their infrastructure. It is therefore important to provide logistical and material support to the parties to the conflict. The incentives must be set in such a way that the parties to the conflict confirm their decision and are able to achieve material compliance with the agreement. Another obstacle to a stable ceasefire in Darfur is the nature of the conflict and the characteristics of the rebel groups. Successful negotiation and implementation of a ceasefire requires the identification of troop locations and the allocation of areas of responsibility. This approach is very difficult to apply to the JEM rebels, because their ‘technicals’ are highly mobile and their base of operations is not tied to a specific territory, as conventional armed forces do.
The last reason is the complexity of the conflict itself. The Darfur conflict consists of several overlapping conflicts that involve a multitude of actors and interests, making it extremely difficult to reduce the extent of the violence and to monitor armed conflicts. If the level of violence is not sufficiently reduced and outbreaks of violence cannot be clearly identified and analyzed, it is impossible to create the necessary trust between the parties to the conflict and to achieve a stable ceasefire. This requires an effective peacekeeping force. However, the hybrid AU / UN peace mission is (still) unable to perform these tasks due to a lack of personnel and material.
If the peace talks in Doha lead to a stable ceasefire and lead to a successful peace process, the political obstacles must be reduced and the operational hurdles removed. This is not an impossibility, but it requires the sincere commitment of the parties to the conflict, the Arab League countries, the African Union and, above all, the additional support and targeted pressure from the international community. The following recommendations can point the way to a potential peace process:
The Security Council must fully support the Special Envoy of the UN and the African Union, Bassolé, in his negotiating efforts.
The European Union must call on the Arab League countries, the African Union and the parties to the conflict to conduct genuine peace negotiations. It must also call for a comprehensive peace process that includes additional parties to the conflict and takes the causes of the conflict into account.
The Security Council should not decide at this time to postpone Article 16 of the Rome Statute as this would bring neither peace nor justice and would only confirm the strategy of the Sudanese government.
The peace process and the successful negotiation of an armistice require the support of a credible and influential third party. The EU could take on this role. The EU must push for a comprehensive and inclusive approach. She should make necessary long-term preparations and not feel pushed to quick results. Above all, it must guarantee the necessary training and care for the conflicting parties.
The international community must also strengthen the Darfur peacekeeping force UNAMID so that it is able to guarantee the protection of civilians in Darfur and compliance with a future ceasefire.
Christoph Bleiker, Policy Analyst Genocide Alert
Violence against women in Darfur
The Sudanese government and its allied militias, the Janjaweed, use sexual violence as a means of warfare. Women in Darfur live in constant fear of new attacks, with the evildoers getting away with it in almost all cases. However, the African Union, the United Nations and the international community have also failed to protect women from sexual violence and to help surviving victims and to bring the evildoers to justice.
The greatest danger for women is to leave the refugee camp for food and firewood. Not just the Sudanese police and the Janjawe > however, only a third of them have been deployed so far. UNAMID is carrying out more checks inside and outside the camps, but the lack of support, especially in the areas of equipment and logistics, places restrictions on the length, frequency and scope of the patrols. The scarcity of equipment also hampers an adequate response to attacks by the Sudanese government, which often involve systematic rape. Furthermore, the use of UNAMID is significantly affected by attacks on the soldiers.
In April 2007, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Sudanese Minister Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed leader Ali Kosheib for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including systematic rape and the use of sexual violence. Be >Arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for genocide and crimes against humanity. One of the reasons for his request is that the Sudanese government is targeting rape in Darfur to destroy the will, the soul and life itself ("to kill the will, the spirit, and life itself"). Unfortunately, people who report rape are currently more likely to be persecuted in Sudan than those who have committed such a crime: no legal action is being taken against members of the military, security services, police and border guards in Sudan. Since this includes most of the members of the Janjaweed, they too can get away with it.
What needs to be done to protect women from sexual violence?
Since the Sudanese government is not prepared to change its tactics, the international community must take stricter measures and give top priority to responding to sexual violence. A radical improvement of the situation in Darfur – especially for women – is only possible through the implementation of an overall strategy. These include the measures listed below:
Execution of arrest warrants against the Sudanese president as soon as possible >
PetroChina’s profitable genocide business in Sudan
The message hit like a bomb. The Chinese oil company PetroChina became the most valuable company in the world (by market value) on its first trading day. What is easily forgotten in the hustle and bustle: PetroChina makes money from doing business with the Sudanese regime, which caused the world’s largest humanitarian catastrophe in the crisis region of Darfur.
The message hit like a bomb. The Chinese oil company PetroChina became the most valuable company in the world (by market value) on its first trading day. The government of the People’s Republic of China will be pleased: it holds approximately 80% of the shares in PetroChina and is the undisputed main shareholder. What is easily forgotten in the hustle and bustle: PetroChina makes money from doing business with the Sudanese regime, which caused the world’s largest humanitarian catastrophe in the crisis region of Darfur. CNPC (China National Petroleum Company) co-finances a genocide through its subsidiary PetroChina, which has now cost the lives of 400,000 people and displaced 2.5 million.
The government of Sudan uses approximately 70% of its total revenue to buy military equipment and arm Arabian militias, the so-called Janjaweed, which have been seriously violating human rights against the civilian population in Darfur for years. The Khartoum regime obtains much of this money from the sale of oil, which is primarily funded by the Chinese CNPC. The latter not only owns PetroChina for the most part. The top management is almost identical and CNPC and PetroChina are part of the same corporate structure. For this reason, the "Sudan Divestment Taskforce" names PetroChina as one of the "greatest offenders" (highest offenders) in terms of supporting the genocide in Darfur. The highly celebrated PetroChina makes its profits on the back of the victims of the first genocide of the 21st century. No reason to celebrate.
As a public company, PetroChina has a vital interest in a high market value. This should be used by the federal government, funds and private investors to encourage the People’s Republic of China to act more constructively to end the genocide in Dafur. China maintains close economic and political contacts with Sudan. The People’s Republic has been Sudan’s largest diplomatic protégé, economic investor and trading partner for years. Withdrawing capital from PetroChina is the best way to show the Chinese government that human rights cannot be outweighed in profits and rising share prices.
We need independent observers in Darfur!
On September 24, the United Nations Human Rights Council extended the mandate of Special Rapporteur Sima Samar to SimaSamar for six months. The Human Rights Council has given itself the chance to take a clear stance against genocide. Such an attitude threatens to make it superfluous in the medium term.
Abdel Daiem Zumrawi, Undersecretary of the Sudanese Ministry of Justice, had previously asked the UN Human Rights Council not to renew the current mandate of current special investigator Sima Samar after its expiration in December. He justified this step because Sima Samar had not condemned "terrorist attacks" by the rebel groups. Zumrawi had also described the special investigator as the "agent of the European Union". This can only be seen as a further attempt by Sudan to avert criticism of its actions in Darfur. Samar was deputy prime minister in Afghanistan and has been the UN human rights rapporteur in Sudan since 2005. In a report dated September 9, 2008, she said that the situation in Darfur remains dire. Uninvolved civilians would be killed by both the government and rebel groups. There were also arbitrary arrests and torture. In her report, Ms. Samar particularly emphasized the arbitrary and disproportionate bombing and the disappearance of civilians by Sudanese forces.
Since 2003, approximately 400,000 people have been killed in Darfur and a further 2.5 million have been displaced from their hometowns. Last year the UN Human Rights Council was persuaded to ignore the report on a human rights situation in Darfur led by American Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams. In view of these circumstances and the previous hindering behavior of Sudan, it does not seem appropriate to hope for Sudan’s cooperation in improving and monitoring the human rights situation.
In this sense, Genocide Alert calls on the German government not to close its eyes to what is happening in Darfur and to actively work in the UN Human Rights Council to ensure that the human rights situation continues to be monitored independently.
Ms. Samar’s mandate has been extended, but only for six months under pressure from Sudan. This is a big disappointment. The situation in Darfur is still extremely serious. Civilians die every day from the behavior of both the Sudanese government and the rebels. The world must not just turn around and close its eyes just because a government responsible for crime desires it. Clear measures must be taken against the atrocities reported by Sima Samar.
Having Ms. Samar on site as an independent observer can only be understood as a first step in containing the violence and stabilizing the situation. But if this first step is not taken seriously, the situation remains hopeless for many people. So far, Sudan has not been willing to cooperate. The world community must not blindly hope that the situation will resolve itself by magic, that Sudan will show goodwill as long as it only gives in to its demands and observers are withdrawn from the country. Extending the mandate by just six months is therefore sending the wrong signal. The Human Rights Council should have taken a clear position. The Human Rights Council has given itself the chance to take a clear stance against genocide. Such an attitude threatens to make it superfluous in the medium term.
Despite the request from Genocide Alert and many other organizations, Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier did not explicitly speak out in his speech to the UN General Assembly for an improvement in the situation in Darfur. It is to be hoped that the Federal Republic will take a clear stance against Sudan, particularly with regard to its own history.
Update: Problems and challenges of the UN-AU peace mission in Darfur
The UNAMID mission in Darfur should be exemplary. The credibility of the UN is now at risk due to various problems. On the one hand, resources are lacking to enable UNAMID to work effectively on site. Secondly, the Sudanese government is trying to prevent the use of UNAMID. What needs to be done to make the mission successful?
UNAMID: challenges and problems
The African Union (A.U.) and United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping force for Darfur, UNAM >
The leadership of UNAMID deserves credit for the fact that, despite all its shortcomings, it is able to improve the protection of the civilian population through more frequent and longer patrols. This can make at least some of the Darfurers feel safer in everyday life. However, due to insufficient equipment, troops are unable to extend the length of the patrols, and some refugee camps still have to do without protection. Due to the small number of soldiers in Darfur, UNAMID unfortunately cannot prevent people from continuing to be killed and houses being looted and set on fire. Unfortunately, the UN’s lack of response to repeated attacks on UNAMID troops by rebel groups and the Sudanese army has increased the population’s impression that the use of the armed forces is ineffective.
The role of the Sudanese government
The government in Khartoum has so far stood out mainly through stubborn blockades. For example, it delayed the recognition of the “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) – an agreement between two countries regarding the deployment of its troops in the territory of the other nation – and thus the deployment of UNAMID by six months. Although the SOFA theoretically enables the free use of the armed forces, unfortunately this is still practically not the case in Darfur.
The Sudanese government is also systematically trying to prevent the full use of UNAMID. The A.U. and U.N. submitted list of countries, the additional soldiers were to be contributed was not approved, and although Khartoum had made some vague commitments to deploy additional UNAMID units, no concrete decisions were made. The international strike forces are not provided with enough land on site to build accommodation and bases with sufficient access to water. In addition, night flights are generally prohibited, and sometimes flight bans were also imposed during the day. Thus, in two government attacks on several villages in April and May 2008, the armed forces had no option but to evacuate injured civilians by land, which is not only time consuming and inefficient, but also extremely dangerous. In addition, supplies are not only held up by Sudanese customs for an unnecessarily long time, the Sudanese government also refuses to take adequate security measures to transport the material through its territory.
How to help
These obstacles make it necessary for the international community to act. On the one hand, the troops need more resources, for example more helicopters and trucks, in order to be able to adequately protect Darfurer in the event of attacks. They also need improved aerial reconnaissance, the use of additional engineers and increased logistical support. So while the international community is required to provide these indispensable resources, it is also problematic that it will take a few more months for the requested material to arrive in Darfur.
Since the UN does not have its own resources to ensure the supply of troops on the ground, it also depends on the cooperation of the troop-providing countries. However, since American companies, for example, are no longer allowed to do business with the peacekeeping mission in Sudan, it is difficult to provide the troops with good supplies. Because most African countries are unable to supply their soldiers in the area of operation, they rely on foreign aid. A good supply of the troops is absolutely necessary and must have a high priority at the United Nations so that the armed forces can operate outside of their bases even during long missions.
In this context, Jerry Fowler (President of the American Save Darfur Coalition) and John Pendergast (co-founder of the ENOUGH campaign) propose to the United Nations Security Council to adopt a decision that sets clear standards and goals for the deployment of the UNAMID force. Bureaucratic obstacles should be removed as far as possible, and they also propose to impose sanctions on countries that hinder the deployment of soldiers. Another suggestion is that UNAMID should hire a military lawyer to monitor compliance with the SOFA agreement and any violations by the Sudanese government, rebels, militias, and criminal elements.
These measures are important because the credibility of the UN and the AU depend on the success of this mission. After the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, declared in May 2008 that UNAMID troops should reach 80% of their target strength by the end of this year, action must now be taken immediately.
This text is based on a paper by the Save Darfur Coalition and ENOUGH.
[Genocide Alert is not necessarily the opinion of the authors of this external link]
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